A characterization of the plurality rule
We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh [Yeh, C.-H., 2008. An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems. Economic Theory 34, 575–583] by replacing efficiency axiom by the weaker axiom called faithfulness. Formally, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only, and faithfulness.
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