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An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju

Abstract

We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:115-128
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0533-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Murat Çengelci & M. Sanver, 2010. "Simple Collective Identity Functions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 417-443, April.
    2. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(3), pages 335-354, September.
    3. Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2014. "A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 153-168, February.
    4. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2009. "Threshold aggregation of multi-graded rankings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 58-63, July.
    5. Aleskerov, Fuad & Yakuba, Vyacheslav & Yuzbashev, Dmitriy, 2007. "A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 106-110, January.
    6. José Alcantud & Ritxar Arlegi, 2012. "An axiomatic analysis of ranking sets under simple categorization," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 227-245, March.
    7. González, Stéphane & Laruelle, Annick & Solal, Philippe, 2017. "Neutral candidates in approval and disapproval vote," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    8. Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
    9. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
    10. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2010. "Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(4), pages 571-596, April.
    11. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    12. Arlegi, Ritxar & Dimitrov, Dinko, 2016. "Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 20-29.
    13. Stéphane Gonzalez & Annick Laruelle & Philippe Solal, 2019. "Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(3), pages 497-517, October.
    14. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2016. "Is majority consistency possible?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(2), pages 287-299, February.
    15. José Alcantud & Annick Laruelle, 2014. "Dis&approval voting: a characterization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(1), pages 1-10, June.

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