Threshold aggregation of multi-graded rankings
A recent paper by Aleskerov etÂ al. [Aleskerov, F., Yakuba, V., Yuzbashev, D., 2007. A 'threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings. Mathematical Social Sciences 53, 106-110] characterizes so-called threshold aggregation rules of three-graded rankings in terms of four axioms Anonymity, Cancelation, Pareto, and Non-compensatory Threshold. In this paper we extend this result to the case of multi-graded rankings, and we provide an alternative characterization in terms of slightly weaker axioms.
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- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, 07.
- Hillinger, Claude, 2004. "Voting and the Cardinal Aggregation of Judgments," Discussion Papers in Economics 353, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Aleskerov, Fuad & Yakuba, Vyacheslav & Yuzbashev, Dmitriy, 2007. "A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 106-110, January.
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