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A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity


  • Biung-Ghi Ju

    (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)


A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency.

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  • Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200509, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:kan:wpaper:200509

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "Partially efficient voting by committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(3), pages 327-342.
    2. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July.
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    4. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, July.
    5. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
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    7. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    8. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    9. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
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    11. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-1091, November.
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    14. Guha, Ashok, 1972. "Neutrality, Monotonicity, and the Right of Veto," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 40(5), pages 821-826, September.
    15. William Thomson, 2001. "On the axiomatic method and its recent applications to game theory and resource allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(2), pages 327-386.
    16. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(3), pages 469-499, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    2. Pritchard, Geoffrey & Wilson, Mark C., 2009. "Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 35-57, July.

    More about this item


    Plurality; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Restricted efficiency; Anonymity; Division indifference; Separable preferences;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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