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A Characterization of Plurality-Like Rules Based on Non-Manipulability, Restricted Efficiency, and Anonymity

  • Biung-Ghi Ju

    (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas)

A society needs to decide which issues (laws, public projects, public facilities, etc.) in an agenda to accept. The decision can be any subset of the agenda but must reflect the preferences of its members, which are assumed to be ¡°separable weak orderings¡±. We characterize a family of ¡°plurality-like¡± rules based on strategy-proofness, restricted efficiency, anonymity, and two weak axioms pertaining to the variable agenda feature of our model, called dummy independence and division indifference. We also characterize a wide spectrum of rules dropping anonymity or restricted efficiency.

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File URL: http://www.ku.edu/~bgju/2005Papers/200509.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Kansas, Department of Economics in its series WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS with number 200509.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision: Mar 2005
Publication status: Forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory
Handle: RePEc:kan:wpaper:200509
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  1. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June.
  2. Ken-Ichi Shimomura, 1996. "Partially efficient voting by committees," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 327-342.
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  8. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "An efficiency characterization of plurality social choice on simple preference domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 115-128, 07.
  9. Plott, Charles R. & Levine, Michael E., . "A Model of Agenda Influence on Committee Decisions," Working Papers 143, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Le Breton, M. & Sen, A., 1995. "Strategyproofness and decomposability : Weak Orderings," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a38, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  11. Plott, Charles R, 1973. "Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1075-91, November.
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  13. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  14. Inada, Ken-Ichi, 1969. "The Simple Majority Decision Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(3), pages 490-506, July.
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  16. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
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