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Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near

Author

Listed:
  • Susumu Cato

    (UTokyo - The University of Tokyo)

  • Stéphane Gonzalez

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eric Rémila

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Solal

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper provides the first axiomatic characterization of a class of certification methods, dubbed proportional threshold methods, that builds on consistency properties across populations and profiles of binary opinions. We then compare proportional threshold methods with the approval voting method. We formally outline the similarities and differences of these two collective decision processes and provide an axiomatic characterization of the approval voting method that, perhaps surprisingly, is closely related to the one of the proportional threshold methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03858356
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03858356
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    approval voting method; certification method; consistency; evaluation; monotonicity; proportional threshold method;
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