Weighted Approval Voting
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.
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- Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2005.
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- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003.
"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1996. "Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 90-101, October.
- Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Ballester, Miguel A., 2005. "Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 116-123, September.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2007.
"Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
- Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
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