Weighted approval voting
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Abstract
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2006038
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Other versions of this item:
- Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2008. "Weighted approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 129-146, July.
- Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 668.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
References listed on IDEAS
- Michel Regenwetter & Ilia Tsetlin, 2004. "Approval voting and positional voting methods: Inference, relationship, examples," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 539-566, June.
- Sertel, Murat R., 1988. "Characterizing approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 207-211, June.
- Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2006. "A Simple Characterization of Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(3), pages 621-625, December.
- Jean-François Laslier, 2003. "Analysing a preference and approval profile," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(2), pages 229-242, March.
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Ballester, Miguel A., 2005. "Some remarks on ranking opportunity sets and Arrow impossibility theorems: correspondence results," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 116-123, September.
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"Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting,"
Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Jean-François Laslier & M. Remzi Sanver (ed.), Handbook on Approval Voting, chapter 0, pages 19-37,
Springer.
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Baigent, Nick & Xu, Yongsheng, 1991. "Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 21-29, February.
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- Laslier, Jean-François, 2006. "Spatial Approval Voting," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 160-185, April.
- Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2007.
"Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 127-141, January.
- Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "Approval Voting ion Dichotomous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 619.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009.
"Size approval voting,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
- Alcalde-Unzu, J. & Vorsatz, M., 2007. "Size approval voting," Research Memorandum 008, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Size Approval Voting," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0703, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
- Matías Núñez & Giacomo Valletta, 2015. "The informational basis of scoring rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(4), pages 279-297, December.
- Martínez, Ricardo & Moreno, Bernardo, 2017. "Qualified voting systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 49-54.
- Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
- Susumu Cato & Stéphane Gonzalez & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal, 2022. "Approval voting versus proportional threshold methods: so far and yet so near," Working Papers halshs-03858356, HAL.
- Houy, Nicolas, 2007. "A characterization for qualified majority voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 17-24, July.
- Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
- Norihisa Sato, 2014. "A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 809-825, December.
- Efthymios Athanasiou & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Shlomo Weber, 2015. "Language learning and communicative benefits," Working Papers 15.09, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Matías Núñez, 2014.
"The strategic sincerity of Approval voting,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
- Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.
- Nuñez, M. & Valletta, G., 2012. "The information simplicity of scoring rules," Research Memorandum 011, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Alcantud, José Carlos R. & de Andres Calle, Rocio & Cascon, José Manuel, 2012. "Approval consensus measures," MPRA Paper 39610, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2006-10-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2006-10-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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