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The Leader Rule

Author

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  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, 91128 Palaiseau, France, jean-francois.laslier@polytechnique.edu)

Abstract

The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:113-136
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629808097286
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    References listed on IDEAS

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