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The Leader Rule

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: A Theory," Working Papers halshs-01168767, HAL.
  2. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2017. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 68(6), pages 1063-1076.
  3. François Maniquet & Massimo Morelli, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 1-27, June.
  4. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel Ángel Ballester, 2023. "The Rationalizability of Survey Responses," Working Papers 1393, Barcelona School of Economics.
  5. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2016. "Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 559-587, October.
  6. Baujard, Antoinette & Gavrel, Frédéric & Igersheim, Herrade & Laslier, Jean-François & Lebon, Isabelle, 2018. "How voters use grade scales in evaluative voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 14-28.
  7. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
  8. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1621-1649, September.
  9. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
  10. Romain Lachat & Jean-François Laslier & Karine van Der Straeten, 2015. "Strategic Voting under Committee Approval: An Application to the 2011 Regional Government Election in Zurich," Working Papers halshs-01168743, HAL.
  11. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
  12. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," PSE Working Papers halshs-01409106, HAL.
  13. Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers halshs-01402275, HAL.
  14. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
  15. Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2023. "The rationalizability of survey responses," Economics Working Papers 1863, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  16. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
  17. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 43-87, January.
  18. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
  19. Núñez, Matías & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2017. "Implementation via approval mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 169-181.
  20. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
  21. Benoît R. Kloeckner, 2022. "Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in Approval Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(2), pages 423-466, August.
  22. Marc Guinjoan & Pablo Simón & Sandra Bermúdez & Ignacio Lago, 2014. "Expectations in Mass Elections: Back to the Future?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1346-1359, December.
  23. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  24. Isabelle Lebon & Antoinette Baujard & Frédéric Gavrel & Herrade Igersheim & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "Ce que le vote par approbation révèle des préférences des électeurs français," Working Papers halshs-01409106, HAL.
  25. Su, Francis Edward & Zerbib, Shira, 2019. "Piercing numbers in approval voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 65-71.
  26. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes, 2019. "Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 388-401.
  27. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui, 2022. "Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(8), pages 1-22, August.
  28. François Durand & Antonin Macé & Matias Nunez, 2019. "Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games," Working Papers halshs-02049865, HAL.
  29. Matias Nuñez, 2010. "Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(1), pages 64-84, January.
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