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Voting as a lottery

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Attanasi

    () (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEM - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Management - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Luca Corazzini

    (Universita degli Studi di Padova)

  • Francesco Passarelli

    (UNITE - Universita degli studi di Teramo - University of Teramo [Italie])

Abstract

This paper studies the issue of constitutional design, and supermajorities in particular, from a behavioral economics perspective. The relevant parameters are voting power, risk aversion, and pessimism. Voters who feel powerful prefer lower thresholds, while risk averters and those who feel pessimistic about the majority prefer higher thresholds. We also analyze the effects of loss aversion and overconfidence. The former leads voters to prefer more protective voting rules, a manifestation of their bias towards the status quo. The latter leads them to prefer overly low (high) protection when they receive good (bad) news about how others will vote. Finally, we study constitutional agreements on the voting rule. Members of the constituent assembly are heterogeneous in the parameters above. Weak and minority members anticipate high expropriation risk in future decisions. This gives them consistent leverage to push for a protective constitution.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca Corazzini & Francesco Passarelli, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Post-Print hal-01744493, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01744493
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.016
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01744493
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca CORAZZINI & Nikolaos GEORGANTZIS & Francesco PASSARELLI, 2009. "Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as determinants of Majority Thresholds," LERNA Working Papers 09.26.302, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    2. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017. "Balancing the power to appoint officers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
    3. Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca Corazzini & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Francesco Passarelli, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 355-386, August.
    4. Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Risky Political Changes: Rational Choice vs Prospect Theory," ISLA Working Papers 39, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. repec:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:2:p:25-:d:236869 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:gam:jgames:v:10:y:2019:i:1:p:9-:d:206940 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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