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Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers

Author

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Danilo Coelho

Abstract

Rules of k names are frequently used methods to appoint individuals to office. They are two-stage procedures where a ?first set of agents, the proposers, select k individuals from an initial set of candidates, and then another agent, the chooser, appoints one among those k in the list. In practice, the list of k names is often arrived at by letting each of the proposers screen the proposed candidates by voting for v of them and then choose those k with the highest support. We then speak of v-rules of k names. Our main purpose in this paper is to study how different choices of the parameters v and k affect the balance of power between the proposers and the choosers. From a positive point of view, we analyze a strategic game where the proposers interact to determine what list of candidates to submit. From a normative point of view, we study the impact of the choice of parameters v and k upon the distribution of power among the proposers and the chooser, and we discuss how to eventually balance it.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2015. "Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers," Working Papers 696, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:696
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven J. Brams & Samuel Merrill, III, 1986. "Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(10), pages 1346-1355, October.
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    11. Gehrlein, William V., 1985. "The Condorcet criterion and committee selection," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 199-209, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy De Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen, 2019. "Order-k Rationality," Working Papers 1130, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
      • Salvador Barberà & Geoffroy de Clippel & Alejandro Neme & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "Order-k Rationality," Working Papers 2020-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    3. Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M Remzi Sanver, 2020. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," PSE Working Papers halshs-02173504, HAL.
    4. Ignacio García-Jurado & Luciano Méndez-Naya, 2019. "Subgame Perfection and the Rule of k Names," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 805-825, August.
    5. Salador Barera & Kareen Rozen, 2018. "Good Enough," Working Papers 2018-12, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting rules; constitutional design; Strong Nash equilibrium; rule of k names;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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