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The Borda Game: A correction

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  • Roy Gardner

Abstract

Recently, a number of authors have constructed axiomatic defences of Borda's rule [2, 4, 8], In every case, it Is assumed that voters mark their ballots honestly, in accordance with their preferences. That this assumption may be unrealistic was known to Borda himself [ij. Elsewhere • [3, 5], it has been shpwn how Borda's rule can reward misrepresented pref erences on the part of individual voters. This result is in the same spirit as, but not a consequence of, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6, 7], since Borda's rule allows ties. This is in marked contrast to Condorcet's rule, where such misrepresentation is not rewarded.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Roy Gardner, 1981. "The Borda Game: A correction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 375-376, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:37:y:1981:i:2:p:375-376
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00138259
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    2. Barberà, Salvador & Coelho, Danilo, 2017. "Balancing the power to appoint officers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 189-203.
    3. Gardner, Roy, 1979. "Onymous Consistent Voting Systems," ISU General Staff Papers 197903010800001088, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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