WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems
We characterize all n-person multi-valued bargaining solutions, defined on the domain of all finite bargaining problems, and satisfying Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Covariance (COV), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We show that these solutions are obtained by iteratively maximizing nonsymmetric Nash products and determining the final set of points by so-called LDR decompositions. If, next, we assume the (set-theoretic) Axiom of Determinacy, then this class coincides with the class of iterated Nash bargaining solutions; but if we assume the Axiom of Choice then we are able to construct an additional large set of discontinuous and even nonmeasurable solutions. We show however that none of these nonmeasurable solutions can be defined in terms of set theoretic formulae. We next show that a number of existing results in the literature as well as some new results are implied by our approach. These include a characterization of all WPO, COV and IIA solutions—including single-valued ones—on the domain of all compact bargaining problems, and an extension of a theorem of Birkhoff characterizing translation invariant and homogeneous orderings. Copyright The Author(s) 2012
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zame, William R., 2007. "Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(2), June.
- Chris Starmer, 2000. "Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 332-382, June.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
- Machina, Mark J, 1982.
""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 277-323, March.
- Mark J Machina, 1982. ""Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7650, David K. Levine.
- Conley, John P. & Wilkie, Simon, 1996. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Solution to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 26-38, March.
- Mariotti, Marco, 1998. "Extending Nash's Axioms to Nonconvex Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 377-383, February.
- Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Nakamura, Kenjiro, 1979. "The Nash Social Welfare Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 423-35, March.
- Vincenzo Denicolò & Marco Mariotti, 2000. "Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 351-358, June.
- Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December.
- Naumova, Natalia & Yanovskaya, Elena, 2001. "Nash social welfare orderings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 203-231, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:851-884. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.