Nash Bargaining Theory, Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings
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References listed on IDEAS
- Lin Zhou, 1997. "The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 681-686, May.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- Herrero, Maria Jose, 1989. "The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 266-277, December.
- Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013.
"Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 66-70.
- Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Rationality and Solutions to Nonconvex Bargaining Problems: Rationalizability and Nash Solutions," Discussion Paper Series 580, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017.
"Voting as a lottery,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
- Giuseppe Attanasi, Luca Corazzini, Francesco Passarelli, 2007. "Voting as a Lottery," ISLA Working Papers 28, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Attanasi, Giuseppe Marco & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2010. "Voting as a Lottery," TSE Working Papers 09-116, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2010.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca CORAZZINI & Francesco PASSARELLI, 2009. "Voting as a Lottery," LERNA Working Papers 09.27.303, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Marco Mariotti, 2003. "Even Allocations For Generalised Rationing Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Cheng-Zhong Qin & Shuzhong Shi & Guofu Tan, 2015.
"Nash bargaining for log-convex problems,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 413-440, April.
- Qin, CZ & Shi, S & Tan, G, 2015. "Nash bargaining for log-convex problems," University of California at Santa Barbara, Recent Works in Economics qt5dn8c7hp, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Zambrano, Eduardo, 2016. "‘Vintage’ Nash bargaining without convexity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 32-34.
- Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for general budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-145, January.
- Hans Peters & Dries Vermeulen, 2012. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 851-884, November.
- repec:spr:grdene:v:21:y:2012:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-010-9194-6 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsBargaining; Nash solution; Nonconvex problems; Social Welfare Orderings;
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