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How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus


  • Samuel Danthine

    () (Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Noemí Navarro

    () (Department of Economics, Université de Sherbrooke)


We generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution and the linear division of the joint surplus when bargainers use different utility scales. This equivalence in the general case requires the surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or comparable, units. This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. In addition, we discuss the requirements on the curvatures of the agents’ utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’ attitudes towards risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Danthine & Noemí Navarro, 2010. "How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus," Working Papers 2010-04, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-4

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Di Nola, Alessandro & Kocharkov, Georgi & Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2016. "Productivity, Taxation and Evasion: A Quantitative Exploration of the Determinants of the Informal Economy," EconStor Preprints 144164, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    2. Kerndler, Martin, 2016. "Contracting frictions and inefficient layoffs of older workers," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145711, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item


    Bargaining Problems; Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution; Linear Sharing;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining

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