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How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus

  • Samuel Danthine

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Noemí Navarro

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Université de Sherbrooke)

We generalize the equivalence of the non-symmetric Nash bargaining solution and the linear division of the joint surplus when bargainers use different utility scales. This equivalence in the general case requires the surplus each agent receives to be expressed in compatible, or comparable, units. This result is valid in the case of bargaining over multiple-issues. In addition, we discuss the requirements on the curvatures of the agents’ utility functions, or, in other words, on the bargainers’ attitudes towards risk.

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File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2010-4.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2010-04.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-4
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  1. Peter Rupert & Martin Schindler & Randall Wright, 2000. "Generalized search-theoretic models of monetary exchange," Working Paper 0005, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
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  14. Samuel Danthine & Noemí Navarro, 2013. "How to Add Apples and Pears: Non-Symmetric Nash Bargaining and the Generalized Joint Surplus," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(4), pages 2840-2850.
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