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Uncovered bargaining solutions

  • Michele Lombardi

    ()

  • Marco Mariotti

    ()

An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-009-0172-7
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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 601-610

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:38:y:2009:i:4:p:601-610
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  1. Banks, Jeffrey & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2003. "Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model," IDEI Working Papers 188, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  2. Ehlers, Lars & Sprumont, Yves, 2008. "Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 87-94, January.
  3. Kim, Taesung & Richter, Marcel K., 1986. "Nontransitive-nontotal consumer theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 324-363, April.
  4. Michele Lombardi, 2008. "Uncovered set choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 271-279, August.
  5. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
  6. Peters Hans & Vermeulen Dries, 2006. "WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions," Research Memorandum 021, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. Lin Zhou, 1997. "The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 681-686, May.
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