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Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory


  • Marco Mariotti

    (Economics Department, Queen Mary, University of London)


The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. The characterisation is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. It is also shown that a subset of Nash's axioms imply the Suppes-Sen relation.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 98/16, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Feb 1998.
  • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:9816

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    Cited by:

    1. Nejat Anbarci & Ching-jen Sun, 2011. "Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 453-470, September.
    2. Richard B. Howarth & Matthew A. Wilson, 2006. "A Theoretical Approach to Deliberative Valuation: Aggregation by Mutual Consent," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(1), pages 1-16.
    3. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Rationality and solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: Rationalizability and Nash solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 66-70.
    4. Eyal Winter & Oscar Volij & Nir Dagan, 2002. "A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 811-823.
    5. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Corazzini, Luca & Passarelli, Francesco, 2017. "Voting as a lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 129-137.
    6. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006. "Alternative characterizations of three bargaining solutions for nonconvex problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 86-92, October.
    7. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2007. "Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 291-305, January.
    8. Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2001. "Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with Arbitration," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 170-195, October.
    9. David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski, 2008. "Ashamed to be Selfish," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2007. "Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 172-180, January.
    11. Marco, Mariotti & Roberto, Veneziani, 2012. "Opportunities as chances: maximising the probability that everybody succeeds," MPRA Paper 41884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Hans Kremers & Harold Houba, "undated". "Bargaining for an Efficient and Fair Allocation of Emission Permits to Developing Countries," Energy and Environmental Modeling 2007 24000028, EcoMod.
    13. Randhir, Timothy & Shriver, Deborah M., 2009. "Deliberative valuation without prices: A multiattribute prioritization for watershed ecosystem management," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(12), pages 3042-3051, October.
    14. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2015. "The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(3), pages 463-478, November.
    15. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2010. "Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 229-232, August.
    16. repec:eee:ecolet:v:159:y:2017:i:c:p:7-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Xu, Yongsheng & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Proportional Nash solutions - A new and procedural analysis of nonconvex bargaining problems," CCES Discussion Paper Series 42, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    18. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2005. "Bargaining In Committees Of Representatives: The Optimal Voting Rule," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-24, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    19. Luís Carvalho, 2014. "A Constructive Proof of the Nash Bargaining Solution," Working Papers Series 2 14-01, ISCTE-IUL, Business Research Unit (BRU-IUL).
    20. Xu, Yongsheng, 2012. "Symmetry-based compromise and the Nash solution to convex bargaining problems," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 484-486.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory


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