Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
The Suppes-Sen dominance relation is a weak and widely accepted criterion of distributive justice. I propose its application to Nash bargaining theory. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is characterised by replacing the controversial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom with an axiom embodying the Suppes-Sen principle. The characterisation is more robust than the standard one with respect to variations in the domain of bargaining problems. It is also shown that a subset of Nash's axioms imply the Suppes-Sen relation.
|Date of creation:||Feb 1998|
|Date of revision:||Feb 1998|
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