Risky Political Changes: Rational Choice vs Prospect Theory
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- Giuseppe Attanasi & Luca Corazzini & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Francesco Passarelli, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 355-386, August.
More about this item
Keywordsprospect theory; behavioral economics; voting behavior; behavioral political economy;
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2011-11-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2011-11-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2011-11-21 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HME-2011-11-21 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HPE-2011-11-21 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-11-21 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2011-11-21 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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