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Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

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  • Ulle Endriss

Abstract

Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:74:y:2013:i:3:p:335-355
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-012-9301-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    2. Rey Anja & Rothe Jörg, 2018. "Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-15, July.
    3. Matías Núñez, 2014. "The strategic sincerity of Approval voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 157-189, May.
    4. Duddy, Conal, 2014. "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 14-16.
    5. Andrea C. Hupman & Jay Simon, 2023. "The Legacy of Peter Fishburn: Foundational Work and Lasting Impact," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, March.
    6. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2018. "Strictly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences," ECON - Working Papers 302, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    7. Haris Aziz & Markus Brill & Vincent Conitzer & Edith Elkind & Rupert Freeman & Toby Walsh, 2017. "Justified representation in approval-based committee voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 461-485, February.
    8. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Buckenmaier, Johannes, 2019. "Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 388-401.

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