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Sincere Scoring Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Matias Nunez

    () (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)

Abstract

Approval Voting is shown to be the unique scoring rule that leads strategic voters to sincere behavior of three candidates elections in Poisson Games. However, Approval Voting can lead to insincere behavior in elections with more than three candidates.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Nunez, 2010. "Sincere Scoring Rules," THEMA Working Papers 2010-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2010-02
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    File URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2010-02.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sincerity; Approval Voting; Scoring rules; Poisson Games;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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