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A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes

Listed author(s):
  • Sébastien Courtin

    ()

    (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise, France.)

It is commonly accepted that the multiplicity of equilibria is ubiquitous in preference aggregation games with any voting method. We prove that this multiplicity is greatly reduced under some mild restrictions over social preferences when each voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes (the Approval voting method). For scenarios with three candidates, we can hence build a map that associates any preference profile to its set of equilibria outcomes; this map is very close to the most well-known Tournament solutions.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2013-31.

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Date of creation: 2013
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-31
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  1. GOERTZ, Johanna M.M. & MANIQUET, François, "undated". "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2326, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  3. repec:esx:essedp:732 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," THEMA Working Papers 2013-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  5. Jean-François Laslier, 2004. "Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate," Working Papers hal-00242909, HAL.
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1997. "Large Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Discussion Papers 1214, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Yasutora Watanabe & Kei Kawai, 2009. "Inferring Strategic Voting," 2009 Meeting Papers 803, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, "undated". "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
  11. Ahn, David S & Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 8983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  12. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni & Carlos Pimienta, 2014. "Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 824-834, October.
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