A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes
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Other versions of this item:
- Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jean-François Laslier, 2004.
"Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate,"
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015.
"Bargaining through Approval,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-Francois Laslier, 2014. "Bargaining through Approval," THEMA Working Papers 2014-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01310223, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Post-Print halshs-01310223, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01310223, HAL.
- Matias Nunez & Jean-François Laslier, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Working Papers halshs-01168675, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Approval voting; Condorcet winner; Voting equilibria; Asymmetric Societies;JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2013-07-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-07-15 (Positive Political Economics)
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