Approval voting and the Poisson-Myerson environment
In this paper, new results are provided in the Poisson-Myerson framework. These results are shown to be helpful in the study of approval voting. Indeed, the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem (MET) substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. An example is provided that contrasts with Laslier (2004) results concerning approval voting. In a voting context with three candidates, the winner of the election does not coincide with the profile Condorcet winner in a three candidates contest. A discussion on the stability of the equilibrium is provided.
|Date of creation:||2007|
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1994.
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1102R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Castanheira, Micael, 2003.
"Victory margins and the paradox of voting,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 817-841, November.
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