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Approval voting and the Poisson-Myerson environment

Author

Listed:
  • Matias Nunez

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, new results are provided in the Poisson-Myerson framework. These results are shown to be helpful in the study of approval voting. Indeed, the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem (MET) substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of pivotal events. An example is provided that contrasts with Laslier (2004) results concerning approval voting. In a voting context with three candidates, the winner of the election does not coincide with the profile Condorcet winner in a three candidates contest. A discussion on the stability of the equilibrium is provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Matias Nunez, 2007. "Approval voting and the Poisson-Myerson environment," Working Papers hal-00243049, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243049
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00243049v1
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    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00243049v1/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Castanheira, Micael, 2003. "Victory margins and the paradox of voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 817-841, November.
    2. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
    3. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.

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