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approval voting

Author

Listed:
  • Enriqueta Aragones
  • Micael Castanheira

Abstract

In a single-winner voting system, approval voting gives voters the possibility to cast a ballot for (or ‘approve of’) as many candidates as they wish – that is, voters are freed from the constraint of voting for only one candidate. The candidate receiving the greatest total number of votes is declared the winner. Approval voting has several compelling advantages over other voting procedures, and has been used by various governments and organizations around the world.

Suggested Citation

  • Enriqueta Aragones & Micael Castanheira, 2010. "approval voting," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:dofeco:v:4:year:2010:doi:1923
    as

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    File URL: http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2010_A000260
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005. "Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
    2. Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2008. "A live experiment on approval voting," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 11(1), pages 97-105, March.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:87:y:1993:i:01:p:102-114_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:03:p:831-847_15 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:78:y:1984:i:04:p:952-958_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    approval voting; Condorcet winner; strategic voting; voting systems;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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