In a single-winner voting system, approval voting gives voters the possibility to cast a ballot for (or â€˜approve ofâ€™) as many candidates as they wish â€“ that is, voters are freed from the constraint of voting for only one candidate. The candidate receiving the greatest total number of votes is declared the winner. Approval voting has several compelling advantages over other voting procedures, and has been used by various governments and organizations around the world.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
|This chapter was published in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume (ed.) , , pages , 2010, 1st quarter update.|
|This item is provided by Palgrave Macmillan in its series The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics with number v:4:year:2010:doi:1923.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/|
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/help/faq#_Toc198623697 Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn, 2005.
"Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(2), pages 457-474, December.
- Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Working Papers 03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2008.
"A live experiment on approval voting,"
Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 97-105, March.
- Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
- Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:dofeco:v:4:year:2010:doi:1923. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sheeja Sanoj)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.