Interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
In this paper is remarked that "mixed" strategies in games of electoral competition do not need to be interpreted as random moves. There are two a priori symmetric parties, and a finite (non spatial) set of alternatives. Parties are allowed to take unclear positions, by campaining on a "platform" that is a mix of several alternatives. Each individual nevertheless identifies a party with a single alternative, the number of individuals who identify a party with a given alternative being proportional to the importance of that alternative in the party's platform.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 24 March 1998/Accepted: 3 March 1999|
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