Party objectives in the "Divide a dollar" electoral competition
In the "divide a dollar'' framework of distributive politics among three pivotal groups of unequal size, the paper compares two variants of two-party competition, the objective of a party being the probability of winning (``Majority Tournament'' game) or the expected number of votes ("Plurality'' game). At a mixed equilibrium, all individuals are, on expectation, treated alike in the Plurality Game while the Tournament Game favors individuals in small groups.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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