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An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

  • Chowdhury, Subhasish
  • Kovenock, Dan
  • Sheremeta, Roman

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support the main qualitative predictions of the theory. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields. However, we also find interesting behavioral deviations from the theory and discuss their implications.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 46810.

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Date of creation: 16 Sep 2011
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Publication status: Published in Economic Theory 52 (2013): pp. 833-861
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46810
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