Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games
A class of integer-valued allocation games -- "General Lotto games" -- is introduced and solved. The results are then applied to analyze the classical discrete "Colonel Blotto games"; in particular, optimal strategies are obtained for all symmetric Colonel Blotto games.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005.
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- Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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