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Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips
[Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation]

Author

Listed:
  • Facundo Piguillem
  • Alessandro Riboni

Abstract

Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that this does not make them ineffectual. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses them as “bargaining chips” to obtain spending concessions. We show that under some conditions this political bargain mitigates the debt-accumulation problem. We analyse various rules and find that when political polarization is high, harsh fiscal rules (e.g. government shutdown) maximize the opposition’s bargaining power and lead to lower debt accumulation. When polarization is low, less strict fiscal limits (e.g. balanced-budget rule) are preferable. Moreover, we find that the optimal fiscal rules could arise in equilibrium by negotiation. Finally, by insuring against power fluctuations, negotiable rules yield higher welfare than hard ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Facundo Piguillem & Alessandro Riboni, 2021. "Fiscal Rules as Bargaining Chips [Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2439-2478.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:88:y:2021:i:5:p:2439-2478.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdaa080
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    Cited by:

    1. Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2023. "Bargaining Over Taxes And Entitlements In The Era Of Unequal Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 893-941, August.
    2. Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2024. "Policy rules and political polarization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(4), August.
    3. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    4. Ethan Ilzetzki & Heidi Christina Thysen, 2025. "Fiscal Rules and Market Discipline," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 73(1), pages 45-85, March.
    5. Maximilian Kellner, 2023. "Strategic effects of stock pollution: the positive theory of fiscal deficits revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 157-179, January.
    6. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2023. "International coordination of debt rules with time‐inconsistent voters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 29-60, February.
    7. Uchida, Yuki & Ono, Tetsuo, 2021. "Borrowing to finance public investment: a politico-economic analysis of fiscal rules," MPRA Paper 115844, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Dec 2022.
    8. Jocelyne Zoumenou, 2023. "On the impact of fiscal policy on inflation: The case of fiscal rules," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    9. Pierre C. Boyer & Brian Roberson & Christoph Esslinger, 2024. "Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 459-491, August.
    10. Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Căpraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2022. "Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).
    12. Delgado-Vega, Álvaro, 2024. "Persistence in power of long-lived parties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    13. Potrafke, Niklas, 2025. "The economic consequences of fiscal rules," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    14. Grosse-Steffen, Christoph & Pagenhardt, Laura & Rieth, Malte, 2025. "Committed to flexible fiscal rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    15. Arawatari, Ryo & Ono, Tetsuo, 2021. "Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    16. Hülya Eraslan & Kirill S. Evdokimov & Jan Zápal, 2022. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 151-175, Springer.
    17. RYO ARAWATARI & Tetsuo Ono, 2024. "Optimal Fiscal Spending and Deviation Rules under Political Uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 24-03, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    18. Antonio Fatas & Bram Gootjes & Joseph Mawejje, 2025. "Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Rules : Do Initial Conditions Matter ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11066, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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