Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games
A class of integer-valued allocation games -- "General Lotto games" -- is introduced and solved. The results are then applied to analyze the classical discrete "Colonel Blotto games"; in particular, optimal strategies are obtained for all symmetric Colonel Blotto games.
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- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2005.
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Dekel, Eddie & Wolinsky, Asher, 2005. "Vote buying," Working Papers 1215, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2004. "Vote Buying," Discussion Papers 1386, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Alessandro Lizzeri, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(4), pages 909-928.
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