IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v237y2024ics0165176524001307.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students

Author

Listed:
  • Lomakin, Artemii
  • Minibaev, Kamil
  • Nesterov, Alexander

Abstract

We examine incentive compatibility of various school choice mechanisms as measured by the number of manipulating students. We find that Boston with Skips Mechanism, Secure Boston Mechanism, and Chinese Mechanism may have more manipulating students than Boston Mechanism. Similarly, Taiwan Mechanism with smaller deductions may induce more manipulating students than Taiwan Mechanism with larger deductions. Computational simulations show that on average Secure Boston Mechanism and especially Chinese Mechanism have fewer manipulating students than Boston Mechanism, while Boston with Skips Mechanism performs slightly worse than Boston Mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Lomakin, Artemii & Minibaev, Kamil & Nesterov, Alexander, 2024. "Modifications of Boston, Taiwanese and Chinese mechanisms are not comparable via counting manipulating students," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 237(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001307
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111647
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176524001307
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111647?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; School choice; College admissions; Manipulability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:237:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524001307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.