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Robust group manipulation with indifferences

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  • Kivinen, Steven

Abstract

We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. Strong robust group strategy-proofness typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe the outcome changes, and indifferent members believe they are essential to implement the change.

Suggested Citation

  • Kivinen, Steven, 2025. "Robust group manipulation with indifferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 554-568.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:554-568
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.001
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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