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Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Author

Listed:
  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

  • Stephen Morris

    (Princeton University)

Abstract

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness," Working Papers 086_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:metric:086_2016
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C82 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data; Data Access
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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