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On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation

Author

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  • R Jain
  • M Lombardi

Abstract

We introduce a notion of rationalizable implementation for social choice functions, termed s-rationalizable implementation, and show that it is equivalent to robust implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • R Jain & M Lombardi, 2022. "On the Relationship between Robust and Rationalizable Implementation," Working Papers 202204, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:liv:livedp:202204
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    File URL: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/schoolofmanagement/research/economics/On,the,Relationship,between,Robust,and,Rationalizable,Implementation.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 5, pages 195-239, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
    3. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
    4. Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Robust Implementation; Rationalizable Implementation; Social Choice Functions; Interim Best Response Property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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