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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium


  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

  • Stephen Morris

    (Princeton University)


A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers 076_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
  • Handle: RePEc:pri:metric:076_2016

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2016. "Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "The Limits of Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(3), pages 921-957, March.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    4. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2017. "First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 107-143, January.
    7. Anton Kolotilin & Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk & Ming Li, 2017. "Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85(6), pages 1949-1964, November.
    8. Ina A Taneva, 2015. "Information Design," ESE Discussion Papers 256, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    9. Douglas Almond & Lena Edlund & Mårten Palme, 2009. "Chernobyl's Subclinical Legacy: Prenatal Exposure to Radioactive Fallout and School Outcomes in Sweden," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1729-1772.
    10. Janet Currie & Matthew Neidell, 2005. "Air Pollution and Infant Health: What Can We Learn from California's Recent Experience?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(3), pages 1003-1030.
    11. Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen, 2015. "Information and volatility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 427-465.
    12. Taneva, Ina A, 2015. "Information Design," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-50, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2014. "Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1952, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    14. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Orazio P. Attanasio & Camila Fernández & Emla O. A. Fitzsimons & Sally M. Grantham-McGregor & Costas Meghir & Marta Rubio-Codina, "undated". "Using the Infrastructure of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program to Deliver a Scalable Integrated Early Child Development Program in Colombia: Cluster Randomized Controlled Trial," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 62cf429ea5b74678a945aa87b, Mathematica Policy Research.
    16. Geoffrey R. Dunbar & Arthur Lewbel & Krishna Pendakur, 2013. "Children's Resources in Collective Households: Identification, Estimation, and an Application to Child Poverty in Malawi," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 438-471, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ludmila Matyskova, 2018. "Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Information Acquisition," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp614, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    2. repec:eee:gamebe:v:117:y:2019:i:c:p:276-288 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 744-759.
    4. Bruno Salcedo, 2019. "Persuading part of an audience," Papers 1903.00129,
    5. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The Good, The Bad and The Complex: Product Design with Imperfect Information," Working Papers 1079, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    6. Eray Turkel & Yunus C. Aybas, 2019. "The Value of Precise Communication in Persuasion," Papers 1910.13547,
    7. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018. "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," SAFE Working Paper Series 218, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    8. Brett R Gordon & Kinshuk Jerath & Zsolt Katona & Sridhar Narayanan & Jiwoong Shin & Kenneth C Wilbur, 2019. "Inefficiencies in Digital Advertising Markets," Papers 1912.09012,
    9. repec:eee:jfinec:v:131:y:2019:i:2:p:251-268 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Beissner, Patrick & Tölle, Jonas, 2018. "A Compact Topology for Sigma-Algebra Convergence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 74, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    11. repec:eee:jetheo:v:182:y:2019:i:c:p:185-217 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Shota Ichihashi, 2019. "Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion," Staff Working Papers 19-10, Bank of Canada.
    13. Vladimir Asriyan & Dana Foarta & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "The good, the bad and the complex: Product design with imperfect information," Economics Working Papers 1643, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    14. Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2019. "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 13643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Aristidou, Andreas & Coricelli, Giorgio & Vostroknutov, Alexander, 2019. "Incentives or Persuasion? An Experimental Investigation," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    More about this item


    Information Design; Bayesian Persuasion; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium; Information Structure;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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