Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Johannes Hörner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(6), pages 1515-1562.
- Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Selling Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1743, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
- Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Selling Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1743R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2011.
- Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2013. "Selling Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000680, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2009. "Selling Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1743R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2012.
- Sarvary, Miklos, 2012. "Gurus and Oracles: The Marketing of Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026201694x, March.
- Admati, Anat R. & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1986. "A monopolistic market for information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 400-438, August.
- Levent Celik, 2014. "Information Unraveling Revisited: Disclosure of Horizontal Attributes," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 113-136, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016.
"Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 586-591, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2027, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers 076_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
More about this item
KeywordsExperiments; Mechanism design; Price discrimination; Product differentiation; Selling information;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-COM-2014-07-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2014-07-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2014-07-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2014-07-21 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1952. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Matthew Regan). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cowleus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.