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Alex Smolin

Personal Details

First Name:Alex
Middle Name:
Last Name:Smolin
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psm213
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/alexeyvsmolin/
Terminal Degree:2016 Economics Department; Yale University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/
RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2023. "Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption," Papers 2309.12122, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
  2. Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.
  3. Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2022. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," Papers 2204.08723, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.
  4. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Smolin, Alex & Yamashita, Takuro, 2022. "Information Design in Concave Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 17066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
  7. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021. "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Papers 2107.10323, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
  9. Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
  10. Romanyuk, Gleb & Smolin, Alexey, 2018. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets," MPRA Paper 86713, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper 84134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes," MPRA Paper 84132, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper 84133, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Smolin, Alex, 2016. "The Design and Price of Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11412, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2014. "Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1952, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

Articles

  1. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
  2. Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 570-597, December.
  3. Alex Smolin, 2021. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 300-331, November.
  4. Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin, 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 250-276, May.
  5. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018. "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 330-339.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alexey Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Post-Print hal-04224372, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2023. "An analytically solvable principal-agent model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 33-49.

  2. Shota Ichihashi & Alex Smolin, 2022. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," Papers 2204.08723, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Rhodes, Andrew & Zhou, Jidong, 2022. "Personalized Pricing and Competition," MPRA Paper 112988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 347, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

  3. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Rhodes, Andrew & Zhou, Jidong, 2022. "Personalized Pricing and Competition," MPRA Paper 112988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 347, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

  4. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Papers 2311.02889, arXiv.org.
    2. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org.

  5. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2023. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Andreas Haupt & Alex Smolin, 2021. "The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing," Papers 2107.10323, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Frank Yang, 2021. "Costly Multidimensional Screening," Papers 2109.00487, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.

  7. Romanyuk, Gleb & Smolin, Alexey, 2018. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Marching Markets," MPRA Paper 86713, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Memory And Markets," Working Papers w0284, New Economic School (NES).
    2. Hemant K. Bhargava & Olivier Rubel & Elizabeth J. Altman & Ramnik Arora & Jörn Boehnke & Kaitlin Daniels & Timothy Derdenger & Bryan Kirschner & Darin LaFramboise & Pantelis Loupos & Geoffrey Parker &, 2020. "Platform data strategy," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 323-334, December.
    3. Amedeo Piolatto & Florian Schuett, 2022. "Information vs Competition: How Platform Design Affects Profits and Surplus," Working Papers 1325, Barcelona School of Economics.
    4. Wang, Hai & Yang, Hai, 2019. "Ridesourcing systems: A framework and review," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 122-155.
    5. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2022. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Papers 2208.03758, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    6. Jinzhao Du & Ying Lei, 2022. "Information design of matching platforms when user preferences are bidimensional," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(8), pages 3320-3336, August.
    7. Johari, Ramesh & Light, Bar & Weintraub, Gabriel Y., 2021. "Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Constrained Price Discrimination Approach," Research Papers 3905, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. Michael Choi & Guillaume Rocheteau, 2024. "Information acquisition and price discrimination in dynamic, decentralized markets," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 53, pages 1-46, July.
    9. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Saeedi, Maryam, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    10. Foster, Joshua, 2022. "How rating mechanisms shape user search, quality inference and engagement in online platforms: Experimental evidence," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 791-807.

  8. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Communication with Biased Senders," MPRA Paper 84134, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    2. Arnold Polanski & Mark Quement, 2023. "The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 463-483, June.
    3. Atakan, Alp & Koçkesen, Levent & Kubilay, Elif, 2020. "Starting small to communicate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 265-296.
    4. Chen, Yi, 2022. "Dynamic delegation with a persistent state," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(4), November.
    5. James Best & Daniel Quigley, 2016. "Persuasion for the Long-Run," Economics Papers 2016-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    6. Meng, Delong, 2021. "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 227-246.
    7. Sadakane, Hitoshi, 2023. "Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    8. Kolb, Aaron & Conitzer, Vincent, 2020. "Crying about a strategic wolf: A theory of crime and warning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    9. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2022. "Markovian Persuasion with Stochastic Revelations," Papers 2204.08659, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    10. Kuvalekar, Aditya & Lipnowski, Elliot & Ramos, João, 2022. "Goodwill in communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    11. Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    12. Harry Pei, 2020. "Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost," Papers 2006.08069, arXiv.org.
    13. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).

  9. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes," MPRA Paper 84132, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Drugov, Mikhail & ,, 2021. "Score Disclosure," CEPR Discussion Papers 16707, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Pham, Hien, "undated". "a reprendre_ WP annulé," TSE Working Papers 21-1263, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.

  10. Smolin, Alex, 2017. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," MPRA Paper 84133, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Contracting over persistent information," Papers 2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    2. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2019. "Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks," ECON - Working Papers 334, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
    4. Heski Bar‐Isaac & Clare Leaver, 2022. "Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 849-861, October.
    5. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    6. Benjamin Brooks & Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2022. "Information Hierarchies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(5), pages 2187-2214, September.
    7. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Hernández, Penélope & Neeman, Zvika & Solan, Eilon, 2023. "Markovian persuasion with two states," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119970, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  11. Bergemann, Dirk & Bonatti, Alessandro & Smolin, Alex, 2016. "The Design and Price of Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 11412, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    2. Flavio Pino, 2022. "The microeconomics of data – a survey," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 635-665, September.
    3. Peipei Qi & Dandan Sun & Can Xu & Qiang Li & Qi Wang, 2023. "Can Data Elements Promote the High-Quality Development of China’s Economy?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-19, April.
    4. Marek Jenöffy, 2023. "Can the Seesaw Model Depict the Certainty Effect?," Working Papers hal-04136569, HAL.
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "The Economics of Social Data: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2171, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Marek Jenöffy, 2023. "A Seesaw Model of Choices," Working Papers hal-04136550, HAL.
    7. Charlson, G., 2022. "Digital Gold? Pricing, Inequality and Participation in Data Markets," Janeway Institute Working Papers 2225, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Tan Gan, 2020. "The Economics of Social Data," Papers 2004.03107, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    9. Anton Kolotilin & Hongyi, 2020. "Relational Communication," Discussion Papers 2018-12b, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    10. Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Helder Vasconcelos, 2020. "On the Private and Social Value of Consumer Data in Vertically-Integrated Platform Markets," CSEF Working Papers 583, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    11. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    12. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2022. "Data Collection by an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17239, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Sato, Kimitoshi & Nakashima, Kenichi, 2020. "Optimal pricing problem for a pay-per-use system based on the Internet of Things with intertemporal demand," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    14. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 8307, CESifo.
    15. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2021. "Competition and Mergers with Strategic Data Intermediaries," CESifo Working Paper Series 9339, CESifo.
    16. Jonas Hedlund & T. Florian Kauffeldt & Malte Lammert, 2021. "Persuasion under ambiguity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(3), pages 455-482, May.
    17. Sameer Mehta & Milind Dawande & Ganesh Janakiraman & Vijay Mookerjee, 2022. "An Approximation Scheme for Data Monetization," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 31(6), pages 2412-2428, June.
    18. Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 570-597, December.
    19. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    20. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
    21. Padilla, Jorge & Piccolo, Salvatore & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2021. "Should vertically integrated platforms be mandated to share information with their rivals?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    22. Lefouili, Yassine & Toh, Ying Lei & Madio, Leonardo, 2017. "Privacy Regulation and Quality-Enhancing Innovation," TSE Working Papers 17-795, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jul 2023.
    23. José Ramón Martínez Resano, 2021. "Regulating for competition with BigTechs: banking-as-a-service and “beyond banking”," Financial Stability Review, Banco de España, issue NOV.
    24. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Selling Data to a Competitor," Papers 2302.00285, arXiv.org.
    25. Alessandro Bonatti & Munther Dahleh & Thibaut Horel & Amir Nouripour, 2023. "Coordination via Selling Information," Papers 2302.12223, arXiv.org.
    26. Smolin, Alex & Ichihashi, Shota, 2023. "Data Provision to an Informed Seller," CEPR Discussion Papers 17963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    27. Saul Lach & Zvika Neeman & Mark Schankerman, 2021. "Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 238-272, August.
    28. Ying-Ju Chen & Tinglong Dai & C. Gizem Korpeoglu & Ersin Körpeoğlu & Ozge Sahin & Christopher S. Tang & Shihong Xiao, 2020. "OM Forum—Innovative Online Platforms: Research Opportunities," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(3), pages 430-445, May.
    29. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti, 2019. "Markets for Information: An Introduction," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 85-107, August.
    30. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2022. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 22/367, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    31. Acemoglu, Daron & Makhdoumi, Ali & Ozdaglar, Asuman & Malekian, Azarakhsh, 2019. "Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 14225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    32. Evans, R. & Park, I-U., 2022. "Third-Party Sale of Information," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2233, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    33. Feng, Xin, 2020. "Information disclosure on the contest mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 148-156.
    34. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2023. "Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)," Papers 2307.05078, arXiv.org.
    35. Mert Demirer & Diego Jimenez-Hernandez & Dean Li & Sida Peng, 2024. "Data, Privacy Laws and Firm Production: Evidence from the GDPR," Working Paper Series WP 2024-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    36. Annie Liang & Erik Madsen, 2020. "Data and Incentives," Papers 2006.06543, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    37. Charlson, G., 2022. "Digital gold? Pricing, inequality and participation in data markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2258, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    38. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    39. José Ramón Martínez Resano, 2021. "Regulating for competition with BigTechs: banking-as-a-service and “beyond banking”," Revista de Estabilidad Financiera, Banco de España, issue NOV.
    40. Jian Pei, 2020. "A Survey on Data Pricing: from Economics to Data Science," Papers 2009.04462, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    41. Jerry Anunrojwong & Krishnamurthy Iyer & David Lingenbrink, 2022. "Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach," Papers 2208.03758, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    42. Jin, Ginger Zhe & Wagman, Liad, 2021. "Big data at the crossroads of antitrust and consumer protection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    43. David Bounies & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," Working Papers ECARES 2020-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    44. Galperti, Simone & Trevino, Isabel, 2020. "Coordination motives and competition for attention in information markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    45. Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, 2019. "Selling Data," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    46. Alessandro Bonatti, 2023. "The Platform Dimension of Digital Privacy," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Privacy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    47. Vohra, Akhil & Toikka, Juuso & Vohra, Rakesh, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    48. Ely, Jeffrey & Galeotti, Andrea & Jann, Ole & Steiner, Jakub, 2021. "Optimal test allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    49. Andreas A. Haupt & Nicole Immorlica & Brendan Lucier, 2023. "Certification Design for a Competitive Market," Papers 2301.13449, arXiv.org.
    50. Ian Ball, 2019. "Scoring Strategic Agents," Papers 1909.01888, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    51. Alireza Fallah & Michael I. Jordan & Ali Makhdoumi & Azarakhsh Malekian, 2024. "On Three-Layer Data Markets," Papers 2402.09697, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    52. Shuran Zheng & Yiling Chen, 2020. "Optimal Advertising for Information Products," Papers 2002.10045, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    53. Ronen Gradwohl & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2022. "Pareto-Improving Data-Sharing," Papers 2205.11295, arXiv.org.
    54. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    55. Chan, Jimmy & Gupta, Seher & Li, Fei & Wang, Yun, 2019. "Pivotal persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 178-202.
      • Jimmy Chan & Seher Gupta & Fei Li & Yun Wang, 2018. "Pivotal Persuasion," Working Papers 2018-11-03, Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University.
    56. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    57. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    58. Ehud Lehrer & Tao Wang, 2022. "The Value of Information in Stopping Problems," Papers 2205.06583, arXiv.org.
    59. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2023. "Competition Between Strategic Data Intermediaries with Implications for Merger Policy," Working Papers hal-03336520, HAL.
    60. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    61. Ichihashi, Shota, 2021. "The economics of data externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    62. Mohammad Rasouli & Michael I. Jordan, 2021. "Data Sharing Markets," Papers 2107.08630, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    63. Shota Ichihashi, 2020. "Non-competing Data Intermediaries," Staff Working Papers 20-28, Bank of Canada.
    64. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    65. Walther, Ansgar & Uettwiller, Antoine, 2019. "The Market for Data Privacy," CEPR Discussion Papers 13588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  12. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2014. "Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1952, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion And Bayes Correlated Equilibrium," Working Papers 076_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    2. Bertin Martens, 2018. "The impact of data access regimes on artificial intelligence and machine learning," JRC Working Papers on Digital Economy 2018-09, Joint Research Centre.

Articles

  1. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and pricing of attributes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 570-597, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Alex Smolin, 2021. "Dynamic Evaluation Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 300-331, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Gleb Romanyuk & Alex Smolin, 2019. "Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 250-276, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Margaria, Chiara & Smolin, Alex, 2018. "Dynamic communication with biased senders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 330-339.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti & Alex Smolin, 2018. "The Design and Price of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(1), pages 1-48, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 18 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (17) 2014-07-21 2016-07-30 2017-06-11 2018-02-19 2018-02-19 2018-02-19 2018-06-25 2021-07-26 2021-08-09 2021-09-20 2021-12-13 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2022-05-09 2022-05-30 2023-10-23 2023-11-06. Author is listed
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (13) 2014-07-21 2016-07-30 2017-06-11 2018-02-19 2018-06-25 2021-07-26 2021-08-09 2021-12-13 2022-03-28 2022-05-09 2022-05-30 2023-10-23 2023-11-06. Author is listed
  3. NEP-DES: Economic Design (10) 2018-02-19 2018-02-19 2018-06-25 2021-07-26 2021-08-09 2021-09-20 2021-12-13 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2022-05-09. Author is listed
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (9) 2018-02-19 2018-02-19 2018-02-19 2018-06-25 2021-09-20 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2022-05-09 2022-05-30. Author is listed
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (5) 2014-07-21 2022-03-28 2022-04-11 2023-10-23 2023-11-06. Author is listed
  6. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (3) 2014-07-21 2017-06-11 2018-02-19
  7. NEP-REG: Regulation (3) 2018-06-25 2021-07-26 2021-12-13
  8. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (2) 2021-09-20 2021-09-20
  9. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2022-04-11
  10. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2022-05-30
  11. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2022-04-11
  12. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2018-06-25

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