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Data provision to an informed seller

Author

Listed:
  • Ichihashi, Shota
  • Smolin, Alex

Abstract

A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex, 2025. "Data provision to an informed seller," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 131-144.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:131-144
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Rhodes & Jidong Zhou, 2024. "Personalized Pricing and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(7), pages 2141-2170, July.
    2. Roland Strausz, 2024. "Correlation‐savvy sellers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(2), pages 266-291, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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