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Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Smolin

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices. I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure policies. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory and qualitatively depends on the structure of buyer heterogeneity. The analysis informs on the benefits of partial disclosure in pricing settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Smolin, 2023. "Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes," Post-Print hal-04547880, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04547880
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12451
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    Cited by:

    1. Rupsa Majumdar & Anjula Gurtoo & Minnu Maileckal, 2025. "Developing a data pricing framework for data exchange," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, December.
    2. Junjie Chen & Takuro Yamashita, 2025. "The Design of Monopoly Information Broker," Papers 2503.19539, arXiv.org.
    3. Pham, Hien, "undated". "a reprendre_ WP annulé," TSE Working Papers 21-1263, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Masaki Aoyagi & Maxime Menuet, 2024. "Incentive Compatible Information Disclosure," GREDEG Working Papers 2024-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    5. Pham, Hien, 2023. "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper 120989, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Mar 2024.
    6. Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_011_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    7. Levent Celik & Mikhail Drugov, 2025. "Score Disclosure," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 135(666), pages 519-537.
    8. Yingkai Li, 2021. "Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information," Papers 2103.05788, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    9. Guo, Yingni & Hao, Li & Shi, Xianwen, 2025. "Optimal discriminatory disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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