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Report NEP-DES-2021-09-20
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Xinghua Long & Rodrigo A. Velez, 2021, "Balanced House Allocation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.01992, Sep.
- Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021, "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 83, Aug.
- Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salani'e, 2021, "Structural Estimation of Matching Markets with Transferable Utility," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.07932, Sep.
- Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021, "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 21-1247, Sep.
- Luis V. M. Freitas & Wilfredo L. Maldonado, 2021, "Quadratic Funding with Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP), number 2021_24, Sep.
- Edith Elkind & Abheek Ghosh & Paul W. Goldberg, 2021, "Contest Design with Threshold Objectives," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.03179, Sep, revised Dec 2025.