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Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Leandro Arozamena

    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella / CONICET)

  • Juan José Ganuza

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra / Barcelona GSE)

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella / CONICET)

Abstract

In order to make competition open, fair and transparent, procurement regulations often require equal treatment for all bidders. This paper shows how a favorite supplier can be treated preferentially (opening the door to home bias and corruption) evenwhen explicit discrimination is not allowed. We analyze a procurement setting in which the optimal design of the project to be contracted is unknown. The sponsor has to invest in specifying the project. The larger the investment, the higher the probability that the initial design is optimal. When it is not, a bargaining process between the winning firm and the sponsor takes place. Profits from bargaining are larger for the favorite supplier than for its rivals. Given this comparative advantage, the favored firm bids more aggressively and then, it wins more often than standard firms. Finally, we show that the sponsor invests less in specifying the initial design, when favoritism is stronger. Underinvestment in design specification is a tool for providing a comparative advantage to the favored firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Leandro Arozamena & Juan José Ganuza & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Renegotiation and Discrimination in Symmetric Procurement Auctions," Working Papers 83, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:83
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    File URL: https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/83.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Favoritism; Auction Design; Renegotiation; Corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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