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On favoritism in auctions with entry

  • Leandro Arozamena

    ()

  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    ()

We examine the problem of endogenous entry in a single-unit auction when the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. We show that, unless the seller values those bidders' welfare more than her own "private" utility, a nondiscriminatory auction is optimal.

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File URL: http://www.utdt.edu/download.php?fname=_127904826353184600.pdf
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Paper provided by Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-072.

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Length: 09 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udt:wpecon:2010-072
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=439&id_item_menu=568

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  1. Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
  2. Tong Li & Xiaoyong Zheng, 2009. "Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1397-1429.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1, March.
  4. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  5. Bikhchandani Sushil & Lippman Steven A. & Ryan Reade, 2005. "On the Right-of-First-Refusal," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-44, April.
  6. Roberto Burguet & Martin K. Perry, 2008. "Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 752.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  7. Federico Weinschelbaum & Leandro Arozamena, 2006. "A Note on the Suboptimality of Right-of-First-Refusal Clauses," Working Papers 92, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Jul 2006.
  8. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1987. "On Optimal Reservation Prices in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(6), pages 763-770, June.
  9. Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
  10. Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 228-259, October.
  11. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1989. "Government procurement and international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3-4), pages 291-308, May.
  12. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes, 2000. "original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 71-89.
  14. Ye Lixin, 2004. "Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-29, October.
  15. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
  16. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2006:i:24:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Naegelen, Florence & Mougeot, Michel, 1998. "Discriminatory public procurement policy and cost reduction incentives," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 349-367, March.
  18. Lee, Joon-Suk, 2008. "Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1407-1424, November.
  19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
  20. Vagstad, Steinar, 1995. "Promoting fair competition in public procurement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 283-307, October.
  21. McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 343-347.
  22. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Introduction to Auctions: Theory and Practice
    [Auctions: Theory and Practice]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  23. Branco, Fernando, 1994. "Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1-2), pages 65-80, August.
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