Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
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- Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2005. "Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-05-09-03-55-40, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
References listed on IDEAS
- Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007.
"Auctions and information acquisition: sealed bid or dynamic formats?,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 355-372, June.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2007. "Auctions and Informaton Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?," Post-Print halshs-00754227, HAL.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Hubbard, Timothy P. & Paarsch, Harry J., 2009. "Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-14, January.
- Yumiko Baba, "undated". "A Note On Dutch Auctions With Time Credits," Working Papers e53, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
- Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2015. "An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 1056-1073.
- Hu Luke, 2013. "Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-11, May.
- repec:spr:joecth:v:65:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-016-1028-6 is not listed on IDEAS
- Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017.
"Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 148-174.
- Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2015. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1501, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Gorkem Celik & Okan Yilankaya, 2016. "Resale in Second-Price Auctions with Costly Participation," Working Papers 1602, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2016.
- Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011.
"On favoritism in auctions with entry,"
Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
- Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2010. "On Favoritism in Auctions with Entry," Working Papers 103, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2010.
- Leandro Arozamena & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2010. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-072, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2018.
"Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(2), pages 231-249, March.
- Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2014. "Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Private Participation Costs," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1421, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- Xiaoyong Cao & Guofu Tan & Guoqiang Tian & Okan Yilankaya, 2016. "Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Private Participation Costs," Working Papers 1604, Nazarbayev University, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2016.
- Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2010. "An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly," MPRA Paper 29123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- René Kirkegaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2008. "Buy-out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi-unit demands," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(3), pages 770-789.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Lamy, Laurent, 2014. "On discrimination in procurement auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 9790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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