An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yaron Azrieli, 2018. "The price of ‘one person, one vote’," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 353-385, February.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro, 2015. "Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 679-701.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
- Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "The Effect of Handicaps on Turnout for Large Electorates: An Application to Assessment Voting," CEPR Discussion Papers 13921, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Peter Grüner & Thomas Tröger, 2018. "Linear voting rules," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_002, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Pavan, 2015. "Introduction to JET Symposium Issue on "Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2016, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
KeywordsDynamic mechanism design; Costly voting; Participation costs;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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