The Benefits of Costly Voting
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- Bulkley, George & Myles, Gareth D & Pearson, Bernard R, 2001. "On the Membership of Decision-Making Committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 1-22, January.
- Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, August.
- Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June.
- Heckman, James J & Honore, Bo E, 1990. "The Empirical Content of the Roy Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1121-1149, September.
- Amy King & Andrew Leigh, 2009. "Are Ballot Order Effects Heterogeneous?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(1), pages 71-87, March.
- Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2009. "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-291, May.
- Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:72:y:1978:i:03:p:831-847_15 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Martin J. Osborne & Matthew A. Turner, 2000. "Meetings with Costly Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 927-943, September.
- Amrita Dhillon & Susana Peralta, 2002. "Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 332-352, June.
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- Dmitriy Vorobyev, 2016. "Participation in fraudulent elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 863-892, April.
- Chakravarty Surajeet & Kaplan Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, September.
- McAfee, R. Preston & Miller, Alan D., 2012. "The tradeoff of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 349-353.
- Hans Peter Grüner & Thomas Tröger, 2018. "Linear voting rules," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_002, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Tröger, Thomas, 2016. "Optimal voting mechanisms with costly participation and abstention," CEPR Discussion Papers 11127, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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