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Vote or Shout

Author

Listed:
  • Chakravarty Surajeet

    (University of Exeter, s.chakravarty@exeter.ac.uk)

  • Kaplan Todd R

    (University of Exeter, trkaplan@exeter.ac.uk)

Abstract

We examine an environment with n voters, each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and the value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.

Suggested Citation

  • Chakravarty Surajeet & Kaplan Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:42
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1682
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2013. "Optimal allocation without transfer payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-20.
    2. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
    3. ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the CMEC," Chapters, in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
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    6. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, April.
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2008. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 337-345, Springer.
    8. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
    9. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 1996. "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 34-45, March.
    10. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    11. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian L. Gale, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1355-1360, September.
    12. ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the US," Chapters, in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, Enero-Abr.
    14. Gordon Tullock, 1998. "on voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1348, December.
    15. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010. "The Benefits of Costly Voting," MPRA Paper 21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. When voting is not optimal
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-05-25 19:41:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; lobbying; order statistics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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