Vote or Shout
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1682
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- Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Vote or Shout," Discussion Papers 1006, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," MPRA Paper 22122, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- When voting is not optimal
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-05-25 19:41:00
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Cited by:
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
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More about this item
Keywords
voting; lobbying; order statistics;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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