Vote or Shout
We examine an environment with n voters, each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and the value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.degruyter.com|
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2013.
"Optimal allocation without transfer payments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-20.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2006. "Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments," MPRA Paper 18481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2009.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments," Discussion Papers 1004, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
- Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "The Swing Voter's Curse," Discussion Papers 1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the CMEC," Chapters,in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Discussion Papers 1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, 04.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
- ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the US," Chapters,in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, Diciembre.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973.
- Gordon Tullock, 1998. "on voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1348, July.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010. "The Benefits of Costly Voting," MPRA Paper 21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.