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Vote or Shout

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Chakravarty Surajeet

    ()

    (University of Exeter)

  • Kaplan Todd R

    ()

    (University of Exeter)

Abstract

We examine an environment with n voters, each with a private value over two alternatives. We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We find that it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and the value for each particular alternative of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order statistics of the distribution of values.

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File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2010.10.1/bejte.2010.10.1.1682/bejte.2010.10.1.1682.xml?format=INT
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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 1-14

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:42
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2013. "Optimal allocation without transfer payments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-20.
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
  3. ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the US," Chapters,in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 4 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  4. Gordon Tullock, 1998. "on voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1348.
  5. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
  6. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R & Myles, Gareth, 2010. "The Benefits of Costly Voting," MPRA Paper 21372, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-424, June.
  8. ., 1998. "Weighted Voting in the CMEC," Chapters,in: The Measurement of Voting Power, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  9. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
  10. Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, 04.
  11. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
  12. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, February.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. When voting is not optimal
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-05-25 14:41:00

This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:

  1. Economic Logic blog

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