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A restriction on lobbyist donations

  • Kline, Brendan

This paper studies the consequences of a fine for violating a ceiling on permissible donations in a competition for a political prize. Increasing the fine can increase or decrease the amount of expected donations in equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4W6Y32H-2/2/6462dd297f9f074e6a2be4170c54bdcc
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 104 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 129-132

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:3:p:129-132
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Gavious, Arieh & Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 2000. "Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 01-19, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universit├Ąt Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:9:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," Discussion Papers 0506-15, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  4. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
  5. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Nicolas Sahuguet, 2006. "Caps in asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, , vol. 3(9), pages 1-8.
  7. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
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