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Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo
  • Gale, Ian

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  • Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," MPRA Paper 6097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6097
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
    2. repec:ags:afjare:141665 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-651, June.
    4. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1351-1354, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 21-34.
    2. Kline, Brendan, 2009. "A restriction on lobbyist donations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 129-132, September.
    3. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    4. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. & Myles, Gareth, 2018. "When costly voting is beneficial," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 33-42.
    5. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.
    6. Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2017. "The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 375-390, October.
    7. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2023. "Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(4), pages 983-1007, May.
    8. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity," Working Papers 15-24, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    9. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    10. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    11. Chakravarty Surajeet & Kaplan Todd R, 2010. "Vote or Shout," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-14, September.
    12. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
    13. Olszewski, Wojciech & Siegel, Ron, 2019. "Bid caps in large contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 101-112.
    14. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    15. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on Political Contributions, Monetary Penalties and Politician Preferences," Working Papers 200912, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    16. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2014. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 115-116, pages 361-377.
    17. Pastine, Tuvana & Pastine, Ivan, 2006. "Politician Preferences and Caps on Political Lobbying," CEPR Discussion Papers 5913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. René Kirkegaard, 2007. "Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds," Working Papers 0702, Brock University, Department of Economics.
    19. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2013. "Soft Money And Campaign Finance Reform," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1117-1131, November.
    20. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023. "Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
    21. Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    22. Chen, Bo, 2019. "On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 60-65.
    23. Xiangyu Wang & Shulin Liu, 2023. "Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 1181-1190, October.
    24. Mordechai E. Schwarz, 2023. "A master of two servants: lessons from the israeli experience about the effect of separation of powers on public accountability and social welfare," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 59-87, March.
    25. Ron Seigel, 2009. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000201, David K. Levine.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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