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Ian Gale

Personal Details

First Name:Ian
Middle Name:
Last Name:Gale
RePEc Short-ID:pga548
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:1986 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)


Economics Department
Georgetown University

Washington, District of Columbia (United States)

: 202-687-5601
ICC 580, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057-1036
RePEc:edi:edgeous (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply," MPRA Paper 6097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership," MPRA Paper 6095, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 May 2006.
  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2005. "Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 784828000000000012,
  4. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2000. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1784, Econometric Society.
  5. Che,Y.K. & Gale,I., 1998. "Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions," Working papers 6, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., 1995. "Entry Fees vs. Reserve Prices in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Working papers 9510, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Che, Y.K. & Gale, I.,, 1994. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers," Working papers 9415, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. Che, Y.K. & Gale, I.,, 1994. "Sales to Budget-Constrained Buyers: Single-Payer Versus Multi-Payer," Working papers 9416, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  10. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1994. "Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result," Working Papers (Old Series) 9402, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  11. Ian Gale & Mark Stegeman, 1994. "Exclusion in all-pay auctions," Working Papers (Old Series) 9401, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  12. Che, Y.K. & Gale, I., 1993. "Revenue Non-Equivalence of Auctions with Budget- Constrained Buyers," Working papers 9332, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  13. Gale, I. & Hausch, D., 1992. "Bottom-Fishing and Declining Prices in Sequential Auctions," Working papers 9215, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  14. Gale, I., 1992. "Price Dispersion in a Market with Advance Purchases," Working papers 9214, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  15. Gale, I., 1990. "A Multiple-Object Auction With Superadditive Values," Working papers 9008, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  16. Gale, I., 1990. "Price Competition In A Competitively Ruled Cotenancy," Working papers 90-21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Ian Gale & Joseph Stiglitz, 1990. "The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings," NBER Working Papers 3259, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Ian Gale & Joseph Stiglitz, 1989. "A Simple Proof That Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Inefficient," NBER Working Papers 3209, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Gale, I., 1988. "Capacity Auctions," Working papers 8823, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.


  1. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 95-118, March.
  2. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 2003. "Optimal Design of Research Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 646-671, June.
  3. Gale, Ian & O'Brien, Daniel P, 2001. "The Antitrust Implications of Capacity Reallocation by a Dominant Firm," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 137-160, June.
  4. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 198-233, June.
  5. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2000. "Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 22-43, January.
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1999. "Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 947-957, April.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1997. "Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 175-200, March.
  8. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1997. "Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(1-2), pages 109-126, July.
  9. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 1996. "Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 373-379, March.
  10. Ian Gale, 1995. "Allocating publicly owned assets: the case of personal communications services," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Jan.
  11. Ian Gale, 1994. "Competition for scarce inputs: the case of airport takeoff and landing slots," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 18-25.
  12. Gale, Ian, 1994. "Price competition in noncooperative joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 53-69, March.
  13. Paul W. Bauer & Ian Gale, 1993. "Airline deregulation: is it time to finish the job?," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Sep.
  14. Gale, Ian, 1990. "A multiple-object auction with superadditive values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 323-328, December.
  15. Gale, Ian, 1987. "Rebates, introductory sales and the Coase conjecture," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 229-232.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1998-12-09
  2. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1998-12-09


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