The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers
This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget-constrained. Unlike the case where buyers are not budget constrained, a single posted price is not typically optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a continuum of lotteries indexed by the probability of comsumption and the entry fee.
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|Date of creation:||1995|
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