Financing infrastructure under budget constraints
In this paper we consider the problem of financing infrastructure when the regulator faces a budget constraint. The optimal budget-constrained mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient firms produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient firms. The third property is that the mechanism is a third best one, that is, the optimal budget constrained output is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Finally, if the budget constraint is too strong, then we have full bunching.
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